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Interest in earnings dynamics has increased greatly in recent years and was fuelled mainly by the rise 
in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries during the 1980s and 1990s, which 
triggered  a  strong  debate  regarding  the  driving  factors  and  the  implications  of  this  increase.  A 
considerable progress has been made towards understanding the increase in wage inequality in the U.S. 
and Europe, but the economic literature still lacks a consensus on why inequality did not increase, or 
increased much less, in (continental) Europe over the same time period (see, for example, Freeman and 
Katz, 1995, Nickell and Bell, 1996, Blanchflower, Loveman, and Katz, 1995). In the US, there is a 
widespread consensus that wage inequality increased because the relative demand for skills rose faster 
than the relative supply under the impact of the skill-biased technological change (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 
1992, Katz and Autor, 1999, Acemoglu, 2002). There are three broad explanations why Europe has not 
experienced a similar increase in the skill premia, despite the same technological developments: first, the 
relative supply of skills increased faster in Europe than in the US (Freeman and Katz 1994, Acemoglu 
2002), second, the European wage-setting institutions prevented inequality from increasing (Freeman and 
Katz 1994, Acemoglu 2002), and third, Europe faced a less skill-biased technological change due to the 
labour market institutions which compressed wages and encouraged more investment in technologies, 
increasing the productivity of less-skilled workers (Acemoglu 2002).  
However, it is inaccurate to think of one “European Model”, as European countries are, and are 
becoming  increasingly  heterogeneous  in  their  welfare  state  characteristics  (Palier,  B.  2010).  The 
heterogeneity across the European countries is one of the motivations behind studying cross-national 
earnings differentials across Europe: countries with different systems are expected to trigger different 
distributional  outcomes.  The  economic  reality  of  the  1990s  in  Europe,  when  the  single  market  was 
implemented (1992) and the single currency was being prepared (Maastricht criteria adopted in 1993), 
increased the pressure on the European labour markets to change. Since 1995, several EU labour market 
policy changes were implemented, influenced by the 1994 OECD Job Strategy, which recommended 
policies to increase wage flexibility, lower non-wage labour costs and allow relative wages to better 
reflect individual differences in productivity and local labour market conditions (OECD, 2004; Dew-
Becker and Gordon, 2008). Thus since the early 1990s, Europe has been moving towards more flexible 
labour  markets,  from  labour  shedding  to  employment-friendly  reforms.  But  the  pace  of  change  was 
different across the 14 EU countries (Palier, B. 2010), supporting the expectation of increased country-
heterogeneity with respect to the labour market structure and the distribution of labour market income 
across  the  EU. These  changes  appear  to  have  worsened  the  trade-off  between  a  strong  employment 
performance and a more equal distribution of earnings, consistent with the relative labour demand having 
shifted towards highly skilled workers (OECD, 2004).   
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The  qualitative  evidence  that  comes  out  of  the  literature  on  earnings  inequality  across  Europe 
indicates considerable cross-country differences in the level of inequality, the structure of inequality by 
education,  age,  sex  and  sector  of  employment,  and  the  patterns  of  inter-temporal  change  in  hourly 
earnings  inequality  in  Europe  (Cholezas  and  Tsakloglou,  2008,  OECD  1996,  1997).  However,  most 
studies explore earnings inequality from a static perspective at the EU level, and fail to account for the 
factors  that  drive  the  evolution  in  inequality.  A  recent  attempt  to  account  for  the  dynamics  in  a 
comparative perspective at the EU level is made by Cholezas and Tsakloglou (2008), which used national 
data sets to decompose the trend in inequality by groups (education, age, sex and sector of employment). 
They showed that the main factor behind the change in earnings inequality was the change in “within-
groups”  inequality  irrespective  of  the  partitioning  criterion.  The  national  datasets,  however,  are  not 
comparable across countries, thus the comparison across countries is not consistent. 
Our study argues for using earnings dynamics to understand the driving factors behind the evolution 
of cross-sectional inequality across Europe, relying on a consistent cross-national comparative data set. 
The fundamental question is why is it relevant to look at earnings dynamics in the context of rising 
earnings  inequality?  Two  perspectives  need  to  be  considered.  On  the  one  hand,  shifting  earnings 
distributions involve the movement of individuals in the earnings distribution over time. Thus earnings 
dynamics  is  one  of  the  main  drivers  behind  the  change  in  the  distribution  of  earnings.  Therefore, 
understanding earnings dynamics is a prerequisite for understanding the changes in earnings inequality. 
On the other hand, earnings dynamics is seen as the bridge between 2 types of inequality: a short-term, 
temporary inequality and a long-term, permanent (lifetime) inequality. Complementing the evidence on 
the evolution of short-term earnings inequality with the evidence on earnings dynamics allows us to form 
expectations regarding the likely lifetime earnings differentials outcomes. In this line of thought, some 
analysts  argue  that  rising  annual  inequality  does  not  necessarily  have  negative  implications.  This 
statement relies on the “offsetting mobility” argument, which states that if there has been a sufficiently 
large simultaneous increase in mobility
i, the inequality of income measured over a longer period of time, 
such as lifetime income or “permanent” income - can be lower despite the rise in annual inequality, with a 
positive impact on social welfare (Friedman, 1962).  
Starting with the US, Canada, and the UK, recent studies on earnings dynamics have stressed the 
importance of decomposing the growth in earnings inequality into permanent and transitory components, 
to see whether the increase reflects an increase in lifetime earnings differentials or an increase in earnings 
instability (e.g. Gottschalk and Moffitt 1994; Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995; Dickens 2000; Haider 2001; 
Baker and Solon 2003; Kalwij and Alessi 2003; Cappelari 2003; Ramos 2003; Daly and Valetta 2008).  
We attempt to answer the same question, but in a comparative fashion at the EU level, over the period 
1994-2001, of high interest given the labour market policy reforms across the EU: To what extent do  
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changes in cross-sectional earnings inequality in Europe reflect changes in permanent inequality and/or 
earnings instability? Which countries signal widening lifetime earnings inequalities? Foremost, our study 
responds to the stringent need of exploring earnings dynamics and the contribution of earnings dynamics 
to the change in the earnings inequality in a comparative setting at the EU level. While there have been a 
few single country analyses (e.g. UK - Dickens 2000; UK - Kalwij and Alessi 2003; Italy - Cappelari 
2003;  Spain  -  Ramos  2003),  until  now,  the  contribution  of  dynamics  to  the  evolution  of  earnings 
inequality has not been explored in a comparative fashion, nor has it been a comparative study of earnings 
dynamics at the EU level. The existing EU studies lack the comparative perspective, as their results are 
usually  compared  with  other  studies  using  different  datasets,  different  countries,  different  periods, 
different  samples,  and  therefore  lack  comparability.  We  aim  to  fill  part  of  the  gap  with  the  first 
comparative study on earnings dynamics at the EU level, using the 8 waves (1994-2001) of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). The consistent comparative perspective on earnings dynamics at 
the EU level offers a valuable insight with respect to the impact of earnings dynamics on the distribution 
of earnings in countries belonging to a common economic area, but with different systems and with 
different rates of adaptation to the economic reality of the 1990s.  
An  increase  in  cross-sectional  earnings  inequality  triggered  by  an  increase  in  the  permanent 
component, e.g. an increase in the returns to education and other persistent characteristics, signals an 
increase  in  lifetime  earnings  differentials,  meaning  that  the  individuals  with  relatively  high  lifetime 
earnings are earning relatively even more. Moreover, the increase in earnings persistency has implications 
for another distribution aspect – earnings mobility: the larger is the contribution of permanent inequality 
in the overall inequality, the higher is the correlation of individual earnings over time, and the lower is the 
year-to-year mobility (Katz and Autor, 1999). Thus increasing inequality triggered by an increase in 
persistent differential implies both a worsening of the relative lifetime earnings position of the chronically 
poor and a decrease in the year-to-year mobility. If the increase in cross-sectional earnings inequality 
reflects an increase in earnings instability, lifetime earnings inequality may have increased very little or at 
all. Thus, in a lifetime perspective, the chronically rich have not gotten richer and the chronically poor 
have not gotten poorer, but there has been an increase in the year-to-year earnings mobility (Baker and 
Solon 2003). 
The distinction between permanent (lifetime) earnings inequality and earnings instability it is also 
useful  in  evaluating  the  welfare  implications  of  the  evolution  in  cross-sectional  earnings  inequality. 
Permanent  or  lifetime  earnings  is  a  measure  of  long-term  resources,  thus  it  reflects  the  individual 
consumption (Friedman 1957; Cutler and Katz 1992; Attanasio and Davis 1996). Individual or household 
consumption (expenditure) has been increasingly used in the measurement of the individual or household 
welfare  (Blundell  and  Preston,  1998).  Thus  increasing  persistent  differentials  imply  increasing  
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consumption differentials, with a negative impact on social welfare for most social welfare functions 
(Haider 2001).  
The welfare implications for increasing earnings instability are not straightforward. On the one hand, 
Attanasio and Davis (1996) bring evidence that consumption is well insulated from transitory shocks, thus 
increasing earnings instability is unlikely to reduce welfare through consumption. On the other hand, the 
complexity is augmented by the disagreement found in the literature regarding the value judgement of 
earnings mobility (Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrison, 1992). The transitory component is the one 
generating mobility, a desired goal linked with the goal of securing equality of opportunity in the labour 
market and of having a more flexible and efficient economy (Friedman 1962; Atkinson et al. 1992). In 
this study, mobility is regarded as the opposite of persistency, and can be interpreted as the opportunity 
for the poor to improve their relative income position in a lifetime perspective. We do not take the stand 
that that mobility is necessarily good, but that the lack of it is bad, as it signals a lack of opportunity to 
move in the earnings distribution over the lifetime.  Increasing earnings instability, however, reduces 
social welfare if individuals are averse to earnings variability and future risk (Creedy and Wilhelm, 2001, 
Gottschalk and Spolaore, 2002). Moreover, mobility may also have disequalizing effects (Dickens, 2000).  
Equally  weighted  minimum  distance  methods  are  used  to  estimate  the  covariance  structure  of 
earnings  and  decompose  earnings  inequality  into a permanent  and  a transitory  component  by  cohort 
(Abowd and Card 1989; Baker 1997; Dickens 2000; Baker and Solon 2003; Cappellari 2003, Ramos 
2003, Kalwij and Alessie 2003). Blundell and Preston (1998) argue that there are strong welfare grounds 
for analysis within cohorts as the evolution of the distribution within the whole population is influenced 
by changes in the age structure that obscure the role of permanent and transitory components of earnings. 
The aggregation to obtain the overall inequality from the within-cohort inequalities for each country 
follows the Shorrocks sub-group inequality decomposition (Shorrocks 1984; Chakravarty 2001). 
Section 2 reviews the literature and the theoretical model of the determinants of wage differentials. 
Section  3  and  4  describe  the  data  and  the  dynamic  autocovariance  structure  of  earnings.  Section  5 
discusses the estimation method. Sections 6 and 7 reveal the empirical results and discuss the main 
findings. Section 8 concludes. 
1.  Theoretical model of the determinants of wage differentials 
There is an extensive literature on earnings inequality and its determinants (e.g. Katz and Autor, 
1999). Because our focus is on the impact of earnings dynamics on the distribution of earnings, we 





1.1. Determinants of earnings inequality  
Following the terminology introduced by Friedman and Kuznets (1954), earnings are composed of a 
permanent and a transitory component, assumed independent of each other. The permanent component 
reflects  personal  characteristics,  education,  training  and  other  systematic  elements.  The  transitory 
component captures random events and other factors influencing earnings in a particular period and is 
expected to average out over time. Thus overall earnings inequality at any point in time is composed of 
permanent and transitory inequality.  
A rise in permanent inequality is consistent with increasing returns to education, on-the-job training 
and  other  persistent  abilities  that  are  among  the  main  determinants  of  the  permanent  component  of 
earnings,  meaning  enhanced  relative  earnings  position  of  the  high-skilled  individuals  (Mincer,  1957, 
1958, 1962, 1974; Hause, 1980). Increases in transitory inequality can be attributed to the weakening of 
the labour market institutions (e.g. unions, government wage regulation, and internal labour markets), 
increased labour market instability, increased competitiveness, a rise in the temporary workforce which 
increases earnings exposure to shocks. A period of skill-biased technological change can, both, increase 
the  demand  for  skills,  and  increase  earnings  instability  (Katz  and  Autor,  1999).  Globalization  and 
international capital mobility can also increase wage instability (Rodrik, 1997). Overall, the increase in 
the return to persistent skills is expected to have a much larger impact on long-run earnings inequality 
than an increase in the transitory component (Katz and Autor, 1999; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2002). 
Across age groups, as postulated by Freeman’s (1975) “active labour market hypothesis”, similarly 
with overall income, the youngest generations of workers are expected to be affected the most by earnings 
instability, as they have a weaker attachment to the labour market compared with senior workers, and a 
lower protection from the labour market institutional factors. Thus we need to account for the differences 
across cohorts when decomposing inequality into its permanent and transitory components. 
1.2. Alternative model specifications for the permanent and transitory components  
Earnings dynamics move in a more complicated nature than the simple permanent and transitory 
inequality. We now describe the underlying mechanism drawing this complexity.  
We introduce several models that have been dominating the literature over the past 30 years. The 
simplest specification: 
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and a transitory component, it v , which are independent distributed both over individuals and time. This 
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µ σ  is the persistent dispersion of earnings or permanent earnings inequality. The transitory shocks 
are captured by the transitory variance 
2
v σ . The variance of earnings at a certain point in time as a 
measure of earnings dispersion:
2 2 2
y v µ σ σ σ = + . 
The empirical evidence rejected the rigid restrictions imposed by model (1). First, the covariance 
structure  of  earnings  was  allowed  to  vary  over  time,  by  considering  time  specific  loading  factors  (




1 2 , ( )
t t it t it t it it v Y v Var Y µ λ µ λ λ σ λ σ = + = +             (2) 
1t λ  is interpreted as time-varying return to skills or skill price. A rise in  1t λ  increases the permanent 
or long-run inequality
ii, suggesting that the relative labour market advantage of high-skilled workers is 
enhanced. An increase in  2t λ  increases transitory inequality, indicating an increase in earnings instability. 
1t λ  maintains the rank of the individuals in the earnings distribution, but causes a persistent increase in 
the spread of the distribution and an increase in  2t λ  changes the rank of the individual in the short-run 
(Katz and Autor, 1999). 
The second extension was to account for cohort effects. Increased inequality may arise from greater 
dispersion of unobserved labour quality within younger cohorts, resulting from unequal school quality. 
Some  studies  rejected  the  hypothesis  that  the  return  to  education  is  the  same  across  cohorts.  These 
differences could be attributed either to the cohort effects or to the larger impact of the labour market 
shocks on younger than on older cohorts of workers (Katz and Autor, 1999). In the same line of thought, 
Freeman (1975) put forward the “active labour market” hypothesis, which postulates that changes in 
labour market conditions, such as changes in the supply and demand for skills, affect mainly new entrants 
in the labour market. The cohort effects were incorporated by cohort specific loading factors ( , 1,2 jc j γ = ) 
on both components:  
1 1 2 2 it c t it c t it Y v γ λ µ γ λ = +                   (3)  
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Third, regarding the permanent component, some studies brought evidence in favour of the “random 
growth rate model” (“profile heterogeneity model”): (Hause, 1977; Lillard and Weiss, 1979; McCurdy, 
1982; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995; Baker, 1997; Cappellari, 2003)  
      =    +        , 
   ~    0,  
  ,   ~    0,  
  ,     ,    =       
(4) 
Each individual has a unique age-earning profile with an individual specific intercept (initial earnings 
i µ ) and slope (earnings growth  i ϕ ).
iii The variances 
2
µ σ  and
2
ϕ σ  capture individual heterogeneity with 
respect to time-invariant characteristics and age-earnings profiles. The covariance between  i µ  and  i ϕ ,  ,  ,  , 
µϕ σ ,  ,  ,  , represents a key element in the development of earnings differentials over the active life. A positive 
µϕ σ  implies a rising inequality in the permanent component over the lifecycle. This is consistent with the 
school-matching models where the more tenure one individual accumulates, the more is revealed about 
his ability. Thus highly educated people are expected to experience a faster growth in their earnings as the 
quality of the match is revealed to their employers. A negative  µϕ σ       
implies that the two sources of 
heterogeneity offset each other, which is consistent with the on-the-job training hypothesis (Mincer, 1974; 
Hause,  1980).  A  negative  covariance  is  expected  to  generate  mobility  within  the  distribution  of  the 
permanent earnings (Cappellari, 2003). 
An alternative/additional specification for the permanent component is the “random walk model” 
(“unit root model”), used to accommodate earnings shocks with permanent effects: the current value 
depends on the previous one and an innovation term  ia π , which accommodates any permanent re-ranking 
of  individuals  in  the  earnings  distribution  (McCurdy,  1982;  Abowd  and  Card,  1989;  Moffitt  and 
Gottschalk, 1995; Dickens, 2000; Baker and Solon, 2003).
iv  
      =   ,    +    ,         ~    0,  
  ,         ,   ,     = 0  (5) 
Thirdly, the transitory component of earnings can be serially correlated, thus  it v  is assumed to follow 
an ARMA(p,q) process (McCurdy, 1982): 
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(6) 
it ε  is assumed to be white noise, the variance 
2
0,c σ   measures the volatility of shocks in the first 
period and 
2
ε σ  the volatility of shocks in subsequent years.  j ρ ( 0 1 ρ = ) is the autoregressive parameter 
measuring  shocks’  persistence,  and  j θ ( 0 1 θ = )  the  moving  average  parameter,  accommodating  sharp 




1.3. Overview of previous empirical findings 
The  existing  literature  on  earnings  dynamics  is  predominantly  based  on  US  data  (see  Atkinson, 
Bourguignon et al. (1992) for a survey). Earlier work focused on fitting statistical models to the earnings 
process: e.g. Lillard and Willis (1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), McCurdy (1982). Abowd and Card 
(1989) fitted models to the autocovariance structure of earnings, however without accounting for changes 
in the autocovariance structure over time.  
Later  work,  Moffitt  and  Gottschalk  (1995,  1998,  2002)  estimated  the  permanent  and  transitory 
components  and  their  evolution  over  time.  Moffitt  and  Gottschalk  (1998),  modelling  the  permanent 
component as a random walk in age, a serially correlated transitory component, with year weights, found 
that the increase in the cross-sectional inequality in the U.S. between 1969 and 1991 has been roughly 
equally  composed  of  increases  in  the  variances  of the  permanent  and  transitory  earnings,  with  little 
change in mobility. Since most of the theoretical explanations for the increase in inequality have been 
aimed at explaining increases in the variance of the permanent component of earnings (e.g. increases in 
the price of skills), they found their result surprising and unexpected. Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008), 
estimating the trend in the transitory variance from 1970 to 2004, found that the transitory variance 
increased substantially in the 1980’s and remained at the same level until 2004, for both less and more 
educated workers. Moreover, the transitory variance had a strong cyclical component, accounting for 
30%-65% of the rise in the overall inequality.  
Baker (1997), comparing two competing specifications for the permanent component of earnings - the 
“profile heterogeneity or the random growth model” and the “random walk model” - showed that despite 
the increased popularity of the latter, the profile heterogeneity model better represents the data. Baker and 
Solon (2003), using Canadian data, combined both specifications and found that the growth in earnings 
inequality reflects both an increase in the long-run inequality and an increase in earnings instability.  
The European literature on the dynamic nature of earnings is relatively limited. In UK, Dickens 
(2000) examined the pattern of individual male wages over time by year-birth cohorts using the data for 
the period 1975-1995. Using a similar model to Moffitt and Gottschalk (1998), he explained about half of 
the rise in cross-sectional inequality by the rise in permanent variance.  
Ramos (2003) explored the dynamic structure of gross monthly earnings of male full-time employees 
in the UK for 1991-1999 using a specification similar to Baker and Solon (2003). It concluded that the 
increase in inequality was due to increased earnings volatility. The relative earnings persistence was 
found to decline over the lifecycle, implying a lower mobility for younger cohorts. These findings are at 
odds with previous literature on earnings dynamics both for the UK and the OECD. Unlike previous 
literature, this study considered also the effect of observed characteristics, finding that human capital and 
job related characteristics account for nearly all persistent earnings differences.  
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Kalwij and Alessie (2003) examined the variance-covariance structure of log-wages of British men 
between 1975 and 2001, using a specification similar with Abowd and Card (1989), Dickens (2000) and 
Baker and Solon (2003), considering also cohort effects. They showed that the increase in cross-sectional 
inequality  was  caused  mainly  by  the  increase  in  transitory  differentials  and  to  a  lesser  extent  by 
permanent differentials, and thus was accompanied by an increase in earnings mobility.  
Cappellari (2003) decomposed the autocovariance structure of male earnings in Italy for 1979-1995 
using  a  specification  similar  with  Moffitt  and  Gottschalk  (1995)  and  Backer  (1997).  Long-term 
differentials  were  found  to  be  the  driving  factor  behind  increased  inequality.  Other  evidence  on  the 
contribution of the two components has become available in Sweden (Gustavsson, 2004). 
Daly and Valletta (2008) compared the evolution of the permanent and transitory yearly earnings 
inequality  for  men  in  Germany,  the  UK  and  the  US,  finding  that  both  components  contributed 
significantly to the overall trend. Doris et al. (2008) decomposed inequality in Ireland without considering 
the cohort effect. They found decreasing transitory and permanent differentials over the period 1994-
2001. 
These studies lack the comparative perspective. Our study responds to this limitation, and explores 
earnings dynamics and the contribution of earnings dynamics to the change in the earnings inequality in a 
comparative  setting  at  the  EU  level  to  bring  new  insights  into  the  earnings  dynamics  outcomes  of 
different systems. 
2.  Data 
In order to look at the impact of earnings dynamics on inequality in a comparative setting, we require 
a consistent comparative panel data. For this we use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
v 
over the period 1994-2001 for 14 EU countries. Except for Luxembourg and Austria, observed between 
1995 and 2001 and, Finland, observed between 1996 and 2001, the other countries are present in all eight 
waves. Following the tradition of previous studies, the analysis focuses only on men to avoid the selection 
bias associated with women’s earnings. 
A special problem with panel data is that of attrition over time, as individuals are lost at successive 
dates causing the panel to decline in size and raising the problem of representativeness. Several papers 
examined the extent and the determinants of panel attrition in ECHP and found that they vary between 
countries and across waves within one country, but these differences do not bias the analysis of income or 
the ranking of the national results (Behr et al., 2003). Ayala et al. (2006) assessed the effects of panel 
attrition  on  income  mobility  comparisons  for  some  EU  countries  and  found  that  ECHP  attrition  is 
characterized by a certain degree of selectivity, but only affecting some variables and some countries. 
Moreover, income mobility indicators show certain sensitivity to the weighting system.  
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We apply the weighting system recommended by Eurostat, namely the “base weights” of the last 
wave  observed  for  each  individual,  bounded  between  0.25  and  10.  The  dataset  is  scaled  up  to  a 
multiplicative constant
vi of the base weights of the last year observed for each individual.  
Separate identification of age and time effects requires earnings observed at different phases of the 
life  cycle  in  each  year,  which  is  achieved  by  exploiting  the  variation  in  age  across  birth  cohorts. 
Individuals are tracked in cohorts over time, however limited to four birth cohorts due to the limited 
number of observations. 
Earnings are expressed in real log net
vii hourly wage
viii adjusted for CPI of male workers aged 20 to 
57, born between 1940 and 1981. Only observations with hourly wage lower than 50 Euros and higher 
than 1 Euro were considered in the analysis. The resulting sample for each country is an unbalanced 
panel.  The  choice  of  using  unbalanced  panels  for  estimating  the  covariance  structure  of  earnings  is 
motivated by the need to mitigate the potential overestimation of earnings persistence that would arise 
from balanced panels where the estimation is based only on people that have positive earnings for the 
entire  sample  period.  Details  on  mean  hourly  earnings,  variance  of  ln  hourly  earnings,  inflows  and 
outflows of the sample over time for each country are provided in Table 1. Mean hourly earnings appear 
to increase in all countries except for Austria where it records a slight decrease. The highest attrition rates 
from one year to the next are observed in Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. For more descriptive 
statistics refer to Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009a) and Sologon (2010). 
[Table 1 here] 
3.  The dynamic autocovariance structure of hourly earnings 
To begin with, it is informative to have a description of the dynamic structure of individual ln hourly 
earnings for all 14 countries. The model used to fit the autocovariance structure of earnings must be 
consistent with the trends observed in the dynamic autocovariance structure. 
Figure 1 displays the overall autocovariance structure of earnings. Overall inequality, measured by 
the  variance  of  log  hourly  earnings,  decreases  over  the  sample  period  in  most  countries  (Germany, 
Denmark,  Belgium,  France,  UK,  Ireland,  Spain  and  Austria),  and  increases  in  six  (Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Finland), with Portugal having the highest inequality in 2001 
and Denmark the lowest.  
[Figure 1 here] 
The overall autocovariance structure of earnings displays both similar and diverging patterns across 
countries. Common to all countries, the autocovariance of all lags observe, in general, a similar pattern as 
the variance. They are positive and quite large in magnitude relative to the variances, with the distance 
between autocovariances at consecutive lags falling at a decreasing rate. The biggest fall is registered by  
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the lag-1 autocovariance, after which the covariances appear to converge gradually at a positive level. 
Variances reflect both the permanent and the transitory components of earnings, whereas higher order 
covariances reflect the permanent component of earnings. Therefore, the evolution of the covariances, at 
all  orders,  suggests  the  presence  of  a  permanent  individual  component  of  wages  and  a  transitory 
component which is serially correlated. Moreover, the sharp decline of the first lag autocovariance is 
consistent with the presence of a moving average process of first order. Both mean earnings (Table 1) and 
all lags autocovariances (Figure 1) vary over time, which signals the presence of nonstationarity in the 
dynamic structure of earnings. 
Although not reported here for reasons of brevity, Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009a) and Sologon 
(2010) find that the autocovariances display different patterns across cohorts in all countries, supporting 
the hypothesis of cohort heterogeneity with respect to individual earnings dynamics. In most countries, 
the variance of earnings for all cohorts follows the evolution of the overall variance, however mixed 
trends  across  cohorts  are  observed  in  a  number  of  countries.  The  evolution  of  the  variance  is  not 
monotonic and the rate of change differs among cohorts. In general, when a change in the variance is 
recorded, the older the cohort, the steeper the change. Moreover, the younger the cohort is, the lower are 
the autocovariances. Hence, given that higher order autocovariances capture the permanent component of 
earnings, it is reasonable to expect that in all countries, for younger cohorts, the transitory variance plays 
a larger role in the earnings formation than the permanent component compared with older cohorts. For 
all cohorts, all lags autocovariances show in general a similar pattern as the variance, in line with the 
overall pattern.   
To look at lifecycle effects, it is necessary to remove the time effect that is present in these within 
cohort  autocovariances.  The  smoothed  lifecycle  profiles  illustrate  that,  on  average,  all  lags 
autocovariances  increase  with  age  at  a  decreasing  rate,  which  is  consistent  with  the  presence  of  a 
permanent  component  of  earnings  that  rises  with  age  at  a  diminishing  rate,  in  line  with  the  trends 
observed by Dickens (2000). 
4.  Econometric specification and Estimation method of covariance structures  
In order to estimate parameters which describe the dynamics of earnings, we fit a parsimonious model 
to the autocovariance structure of earnings for each country. In order to differentiate lifecycle effects from 
secular  changes  in  earnings  inequality,  earnings  differentials  are  explored  by  cohort.  The  empirical 
specification of earnings follows the structure:  
, 1,..., , 1,..., ict ct ict i c Y Y r t T i N = + = =               (7),  
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where  ict Y  is the natural logarithm of real hourly earnings of the i-th individual, from the c-th cohort 
in the t-th year,  ct Y is the year-cohort specific mean and  ict r  is the individual-specific deviation from the 
year-cohort  specific  mean.
ix  ict r   are  assumed  to  be  independently  distributed  across  individuals,  but 
autocorrelated over time. This study approaches the problem of choosing a longitudinal process for the 
demeaned earnings, ict r , in a similar manner with time series, following McCurdy (1981, 1982).  
The  graphical  inspection  of  the  autocovariance  structure  of  earnings  in  section  3,  suggests  the 
following features of the data:  
(i)  the elements of the autocovariance structure decrease with the lag at a decreasing rate  
(ii)  they converge gradually at a positive level;  
(iii)   the lag-1 autocovariance drops to a larger extent compared with higher order autocovariances, 
which decline more gradually;  
(iv)   the autocovariances and mean earnings vary over the sample period, so they cannot be assumed 
to be stationary over sample period;  
(v)  the autocovariances vary with age controlling for the period effect, hence they cannot be assumed 
to be stationary over the life cycle;  
(vi)   the variance-covariance structure appears to be cohort specific. 
Our model incorporates these features. Feature (i) suggests the presence of an AR(1) process, but 
feature (iii) calls for a more complex ARMA (1, 1) process. Feature (ii) is captured by the presence of the 
permanent  component.  Feature  (iv)  is  accommodated  by  incorporating  period  specific  parameters, 
allowing the two components of earnings to vary over time. Feature (v) is captured by modelling the 
permanent individual component as a random walk and/or random growth in age. Cohort heterogeneity 
(vi) is incorporated by parameters that allow the permanent and transitory components to vary between 
cohorts and by allowing for heterogenous initial variances. 
To avoid choosing a model specification that is inconsistent with the data, we start with a broad class 
of  models  for  ict r   and  employ  preliminary  data  analysis  procedures  to  choose  among  competing 
specifications.  The  following  general  specification  encompasses  the  relevant  aspects  of  earnings 
dynamics considered above.  
       −          =      =  1  
1 [   +         +     ] +  2  
2     
   ~    0,  
  ,   ~    0,  
  ,     ,    =     
(8) 
       =   ,   ,    +    ,         ~    0,  
  ,         ,   ,   ,     = 0  (9) 
      =    ,    +     +    ,   ,   ~     0,  
  ,       ~ 0,  , 
     (10) 
Based  on  equation  (8),  earnings  are  decomposed  into  a  permanent  component 
1 1 [ ] c t i i it iat age u γ λ µ ϕ + +  and a transitory component  2 2 c t it v γ λ . The component  i i it age µ ϕ +  models the  
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individual  age-profile  heterogeneity.  The  parameterization  of  the  permanent  component  includes  a 
random growth ( i i it age µ ϕ + ) and a random walk in age (9). The variance of the first period shock 
(assumed to be at age 20




and is considered part of the unobserved 
heterogeneity. The transitory component follows an ARMA(1,1) process (equation (10))
xi.  
The  non-stationary  pattern  of  earnings  is  captured  by  time  specific  loading  factors  on  both 
components,  , 1,2; 0,7 kt k t λ = = , normalized to 1 in the first wave for identification
xii. Cohort heterogeneity is 
accommodated by cohort specific loading factors on both components,  , 1,2 jc j γ =  normalized to 1 for 
the oldest cohort for identification. 
When working with ARMA(p,q) processes in the context of panel data, McCurdy (1981, 1982), and 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) underlined the need for a treatment of initial conditions
xiii. The autoregressive 
process induces a recursive structure in the moments: the variance-covariance in year t depends on the 
transitory variance-covariance in year t-1. Tracking the recursion back to the first sample year for each 
cohort  raises  the  question  of  what  the  initial  transitory  variance  should  be  for  each  cohort.  Earlier 
literature  restricted  the  initial  transitory  variance  to  be  equal  across  cohorts.  In  line  with  the  recent 
literature, our model acknowledges earnings volatility varies across cohorts and therefore such a strong 
assumption is untenable. Following McCurdy (1981, 1982), the cohort initial transitory variances are 
treated as 4 additional parameters to be estimated.  
Earnings differentials within each cohort is characterised by modelling the covariance structure of 
earnings:  0 ( ) ( , ), 0,..., ict ict ict s c c VarCov Y E r r s T t − = = −
xiv
.  The  parameters  that  are  estimated  are:
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 0, , , , ,cov( ), , , , , , , , 1,...4. c t i i c t c c µ ϕ π ε γ λ σ σ µϕ σ γ λ ρ θ σ σ =
 
For  refreshing  the  meaning  of  each 
parameter, please refer to Section 1.2. 
The  parameters  of  the  models  are  fit  to  the  covariance  structure  for  each  cohort  using  equally 
weighted minimum distance methods of estimation. The methodology is similar with Cappellari (2003), 
Baker  and  Solon  (2003),  Ramos  (2003),  Kalwij  and  Alessie  (2003),  Dickens  (2000),  Baker  (1997), 
Abowd  and  Card  (1989),  adapted  to  unbalanced  panels.  For  a  complete  technical  description  of  the 
estimation model, please refer to Sologon and O’Donoghue (2009a) and Sologon (2010). 
The aggregation to obtain the overall inequality from the within-cohort inequalities for each country 





( ) ( )( ) , k k k k k k k
k k
I n n I n n I PV TV µ µ
= =
= + − = + ∑ ∑         (11) 
where nk, PVk, TVk, µk stand for the population size, permanent variance, transitory variance and mean of 
ln hourly earnings of the cohort k, and n, µ stand for the whole population. The first term accounts for the  
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aggregated within-cohort inequality and the second for the between-cohort inequality. The aggregated 




( ) ( ) k k k k
k k
Aggregated Within I n n PV n n TV
= =
= + ∑ ∑           (12) 
5.  Results of Covariance Structure Estimation 
The  general  specification of the  error  component  model  outlined  in  Section  4,  encompassing  all 
relevant aspects of earnings dynamics, is fit to the elements of the covariance matrix of each country, for 
all cohorts pooled together
xv. Similar to Dickens (2000), all variances are restricted to be positive by 
estimating the variance equal to the exponent of the parameter. The reported variance estimates are the 
exponent of the parameter.  
5.1. Estimation results I: Time and Cohort Shifters[PI+AR(1)] 
As a starting point, we specify the models for the different countries in the same way to assure the 
comparability of the parameter estimates across countries. Table 2 reports the estimation results of our 
common model. The data for some countries cannot support a random growth or a random walk for 
modelling  the  permanent  component,  or  a  moving  average  process  for  modelling  the  transitory 
components. Consequently, the general specification that could be fit in all countries has a permanent 
component  following  the canonical  model,  a  transitory  component  following  an  AR(1)  process  with 
heterogenous initial variances, and time and cohort shifters on both components. 
[Table 2 here] 
Permanent component 
The highest persistent dispersion is found in Portugal, Spain, France, Germany and Ireland, and the 
lowest in Denmark and Finland. The time-specific loading factors for the permanent component indicate 
that,  overall,  the  returns  to  skills  increased  over  the  sample  period  in  all  countries,  except  Austria, 
Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and Spain. The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the permanent 
earnings suggest an increase in persistent disparities over the lifecycle in all countries. These trends 
confirm the expectation that permanent earnings differentials play a much larger role in the formation of 
earnings differentials of older cohorts compared with younger ones, which experience higher earnings 
volatility due to temporary contracts.  
Transitory component 
The variance of initial conditions, which represents the accumulation of shocks up to the starting year 
of the panel for each cohort, is smaller than the variance of subsequent shocks in all countries, except  
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Luxembourg, UK (oldest three cohorts), Ireland and Finland. Overall, the variance of initial conditions 
increases over the lifecycle in most countries except Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Spain, and Austria. 
The pattern, however, is not monotonic across cohorts.  
The  magnitude  of  the  autoregressive  parameter  varies  between  countries.  A  large  autoregressive 
parameter, suggesting persistent shocks, is recorded in Austria, Portugal, and Greece, where between 
13.4% and 4.4% of a shock is still present after 8 years. A small autoregressive parameter suggesting that 
shocks die out quickly is recorded in Luxembourg, Spain, Finland, France, where between 0.001% and 
0.06% of a shock is still present after 8 years. 
The time-specific loading factors show that, overall, the role of the transitory variance decreased over 
the sample period in all countries, except Luxembourg and Finland. The magnitude of the time loading 
factors  for  the  transitory  component  is  lower  than  for  the  permanent  one  in  most  countries,  except 
Luxembourg, where the values are similar. The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the transitory 
earnings indicate that, in general, earnings volatility is higher for younger cohorts, confirming the pattern 
observed in the dynamic description of the autocovariance structure of earnings, where autocovariances 
were found to be lower for younger cohorts. This is expected, given the more frequent job changes and 
less stable earnings of younger workers. 
5.2. Estimation results II: Time and Cohort Shifters[RG+AR(1)] 
We also specified a second more complex common model, where the permanent component follows a 
random growth. This model, however, could be fit only in 8 countries (Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, 
UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Finland), whereas for the rest the SE of some of the parameters for the 
random growth could not be estimated as the variances are estimated to be close to zero. Table 3 reports 
the estimation results.  
[Table 3 here] 
Permanent component 
The  highest  dispersions  in  the  time-invariant  individual  specific  attributes  determining  wage 
differentials are observed in Germany, Spain and Netherlands. The estimated random slope variance 
implies that hourly earnings growth for an individual located one standard deviation above the mean in 
the distribution of φ is the largest in Germany, where it is with 4.89%
xvi faster than the cohort mean, 
followed  by  Netherlands and  Ireland  with 1.41%, Greece,  UK,  Finland,  Denmark  (between  1.21%  - 
0.92%), and Spain (0.59%). All these countries have a negative covariance between the time-invariant 
individual specific effect and the individual-specific slope of the age-earning profile, implying a negative  
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association between initial and lifecycle heterogeneity. Therefore, earnings mobility is present within the 
distribution of permanent earnings over the sample period, in agreement with previous studies. 
The introduction of the random growth specification influences most of the other parameters. The 
overall trend of the time shifters for the permanent component is reversed in most countries, except 
Denmark and Finland. Thus controlling for the lifecycle variation, the returns to skills appear to increase 
in Germany, Spain and Finland, and to decrease in rest. The trend reversal indicates the sensitivity of the 
parameters estimates to the model specification. Excluding the random growth specification results in its 
effect being picked up by other parameters in the model. The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters 
indicate an increase in permanent inequality over the life cycle in Germany, Netherlands, and Spain, a 
decrease in the rest, a slightly different picture compared with the previous specification. The decrease 
over the lifecycle may be due to younger cohorts having more heterogeneous skills or experiencing larger 
permanent shocks even without a larger dispersion of skills. This could be the case if the labour market 
has become tougher over time. 
Transitory variance 
The introduction of the random growth had a smaller impact on the parameters in the transitory 
component.  The  variance  of  initial  shocks  is  smaller  than  the  variance  of  subsequent  shocks  in  all 
countries,  except  UK  (oldest  three  cohorts),  Ireland  and  Finland  (the  middle  cohorts).  Overall,  the 
variance of initial conditions increases over the lifecycle in most countries except Germany, Netherlands 
Ireland, and Spain
xvii.  
Moderately persistent shocks are recorded in Denmark, Greece and UK, where between 0.79% and 
0.17% of a shock is still present after 8 years. Shocks that die out quickly are recorded in Spain, Finland 
and Ireland where between only 0.001% and 0.01% of a shock is still present after 8 years. 
The time-specific loading factors show that, overall, the role of the transitory variance decreased over 
the sample period in all countries, except Ireland. The magnitude of the time loading factors for the 
transitory component is lower than for the permanent one in most countries, except Ireland, where the 
values are similar. The estimates of the cohort-specific shifters for the transitory earnings also indicate, in 
general, a higher earnings volatility for younger cohorts compared with older cohorts. 
6.  Inequality Decomposition into Permanent and Transitory Inequality using Country-
Specific Error Components Models 
We  now  try  to  understand  how  the  changes  in  permanent  and  transitory  inequality  impact  on 
inequality, by using error component models to decompose within-cohort inequality into its permanent 
and transitory components. Unlike the previous section where we used common models for all countries,  
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in this section, in order to explain as much as possible of the earnings error structure and to be more 
consistent with the data in each country we use the models that best fit the data in each country.  
In choosing the best country-specific model we follow a general to specific strategy, by imposing 
additional restrictions on the general model (8)-(10). Table 4 reports the parameters of the best fitting 
models. The estimation of the general model which incorporates both the random growth and the random 
walk specifications in the permanent component had identification problems in all countries. The ARMA 
process was found in three countries and homogenous initial conditions in four. In all countries, the 
models incorporating both time and cohort shifters performed the best. The tests for alternative models 
are included in Sologon and O'Donoghue (2009a) and Sologon (2010). 
[Table 4 here] 
In Germany, Netherlands, UK, Ireland, and Finland, the permanent component follows a random 
growth  in  age  and  the  transitory  component  an  AR(1)  process  with  heterogeneous  initial  variances. 
Similarly in Denmark, except the permanent component follows a random walk in age. In Italy, Greece 
and Spain, the permanent component follows a random growth in age, and the transitory component an 
ARMA(1,1) process, with heterogeneous initial variances except in Spain. For the rest, the persistent 
dispersion  follows  the  canonical  model,  and  the  transitory  component  an  AR(1)  process,  with 
heterogenous initial variances except in Portugal and Austria.
xviii 
Inequality Decomposition and the Welfare Implications 
We now use these parameters to decompose within-cohort earnings inequality into permanent and 
transitory inequality. Given that labour market changes affect people differently at different lifecycle 
stages, that young people are exposed to a larger extent to temporary contracts, more frequent promotions 
and  more  earnings  volatility  compared  with  older  workers  where  promotion  and  changes  are  less 
frequent, the inequality decomposition is conducted by cohorts.
xix The within-cohort inequalities together 
with  the  between-cohorts  inequality  are  used  to  obtain  the  aggregate  overall  inequality  components 
following the Shorrocks sub-group inequality decomposition (Shorrocks 1984; Chakravarty 2001). As a 
last step we assess the absolute and relative contribution of the aggregated permanent and transitory 
inequality  to  the  evolution  of  the  aggregated  within-cohort  inequality,  as  main  drivers  behind  the 
evolution of overall inequality. 
A fairly common age effect could be identified across all countries: both in relative and absolute 
terms, individual earnings within-inequality contains a highly permanent component for the oldest three 
cohorts and a highly transitory component for the youngest cohort. This is consistent with the evidence of 
lifecycle earnings divergence showing that earnings volatility is higher at younger ages.
xx   
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The trends in the aggregated overall inequality, within and between-cohort inequality, both in levels 
and relative shares of the overall inequality are displayed in Table 5.
xxi We report only the actual overall 
inequality as the predicted overall inequality is almost identical with the actual inequality. Portugal and 
Denmark record the highest and the lowest overall inequality both in the 1
st and last wave observed.
xxii  
[Table 5 here] 
The other countries shift their ranks over time. Overall inequality increases significantly in Finland, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Portugal, stagnates in France, and decreases significantly in 
the other seven countries. Common across countries, the aggregated within-cohort inequality dominates 
the structure of the overall inequality, being the main driver behind the evolution of overall inequality 
over the sample period.
xxiii One exception is France, where the decrease in the within inequality was 
counteracted  by  an  increase  of  the  same  magnitude  in  the  between-cohort  inequality,  preserving  the 
overall inequality between 1994 and 2001. 
Only in Greece and France did the share of the between-cohort differentials grow. In nine of the 
countries,  the  incidence  of  the  between-cohort  differences  have  reduced,  signalling  either  narrowing 
education differentials or changing returns. For example, Cholezas and Tsakloglou (2008) find narrowing 
educational differentials for Finland (between mid 80s and late 90s), Italy (between late 80s and early 
2000s), UK (early 1990s and early 2000s) and increasing educational differentials for France between 
early 1990s and early 2000s. For Greece, Tsakloglou and Cholezas (2005) find increasing returns to 
education in the 1990s.  
The largest drop in the share of the between-cohort differentials is recorded in Ireland (22% to 9%). 
This trend is consistent with the narrowing of the gap in the age-earning profiles, mostly likely due to a 
large  increase  in  the  returns  to  skills  and  the  skills  of  the  young  generation.  Also  the  increase  in 
immigration might play a role (Barret, Fitzgerald, and Nolan. 2000). 
So far we have shown that the trend in overall inequality was determined mainly by the aggregated 
within-cohort inequality. Next we show the impact of earnings dynamics on the aggregated within-cohort 
inequality. Table 6 reveals the evolution of the aggregated within-cohort inequality, its permanent and 
transitory components, both in levels and relative shares. The exacerbation of the within-cohort inequality 
– the main driver of the increase in overall inequality - is the result of increasing permanent differentials 
in Finland, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg, and of increasing transitory differentials in Netherlands and 
Portugal.  The  increase  in  inequality  is  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  share  of  the  permanent 
inequality, except in Netherlands and Portugal, where the opposite holds. The decrease in the aggregated 
within-cohort  inequality  reflects  a  decrease  in  both  components  in  Austria  and  UK,  a  decrease  in 
permanent inequality in Belgium, Germany, Denmark and Spain, and a decrease in transitory inequality 
in  France  and  Ireland
xxiv.  Austria,  France,  UK  and  Ireland  experience  an  increase  in  the  share  of  
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permanent inequality, whereas the other four countries experience the opposite. The relative structure of 
the within-cohort inequality of each cohort follows in general the overall trends, except the oldest cohort 
in Belgium, the youngest threes cohorts in Germany, the second youngest cohort in Denmark and the 
youngest cohort in UK and Finland, which reveal the differential impact across cohorts of the labour 
market changes. (Table A.1) 
The most dramatic within-cohort inequality structural changes over the sample period are recorded in 
Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium, where transitory inequality becomes dominant with a share of 62%, 
57% and 55%; Finland, Greece, where the permanent component becomes dominant accounting for 63% 
and 61% of the overall within-inequality. For the rest, the structure is maintained, with slight alterations: 
in Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, France and the UK the permanent component enhances its dominance 
reaching a share of 76%, 70%, 66%, 65%, and 62%; in Germany, Portugal and Spain the incidence of the 
permanent inequality decreases, remaining dominant with an incidence of 67%, 61% and 56%; in Austria, 
the share of the permanent increases to 50%. 
xxv 
Welfare implications 
Most important are the welfare implications of these trends. Identifying the dominant component 
which has driven the change in earnings inequality allows us to gauge the implications of the trends in 
cross-sectional inequality for lifetime earnings inequality. The growth of overall inequality reflects an 
increase in lifetime earnings inequality accompanied by a decrease in the year-to-year mobility, thus both 
a worsening earnings position of the chronically poor and a decreased opportunity for the chronically 
poor  to  improve  their  earnings  position  in  a  lifetime  perspective  in  Greece,  Finland,  Italy  and 
Luxembourg. In the Netherlands and Portugal, the growth in inequality reflects an increase in earnings 
instability: thus the chronically poor have not gotten poorer and the chronically rich have not gotten 
richer,  but  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the  year-to-year  earnings  mobility.  The  findings  for  the 
Netherlands  and  Portugal  may  support  the  “offsetting  mobility”  argument:  lifetime  inequality  may 
decrease despite the increase in the cross-sectional inequality provided that there has been a sufficiently 
large increase in mobility. 
The decrease in overall inequality reflects a decrease in lifetime earnings inequality, accompanied by 
an  increase  in  year-to-year-mobility  in  Denmark,  Belgium,  Germany  and  Spain,  signalling  both  a 
bettering earnings position of the chronically poor and an increased opportunity for the chronically poor 
to  improve  their  earnings  position  in  a  lifetime  perspective.  In  France  and  Ireland,  the  stagnation  / 
decrease  in  overall  inequality  reflects  a  decrease  in  earnings  instability  and  a  stagnation  in  lifetime 
inequality, accompanied by a decrease in the year-to year mobility: thus the relative earnings position of 
the chronically poor has not changed, but they recorded a decrease in their opportunity to improve their  
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earnings  position  long-term.  In  Austria  and  UK,  both  lifetime  inequality  and  earnings  instability 
decreased,  and  were  accompanied  by  a  decrease  in  the  year-to-year  mobility,  signalling  a  bettering 
earnings position of the chronically poor, but a decrease in their opportunity to improve their earnings 
position in a lifetime perspective. 
Potential Contextual Explanations  
What  has  caused  the  differential  trends  in  long-run  inequality  and  instability  across  the  14  EU 
countries is an important subject for continuing research. In the 1980s - early 1990s, in the U.S. the 
increase in persistent in inequality has been attributed to increasing returns to education due to the skill-
biased technological change which increased the relative demand for high-skill labour (Katz and Autor, 
2000, Acemoglu 2002). In Canada, which experienced an increase in persistent inequality despite little 
change in the return to education, the explanation was attributed to a dramatic increase in the supply of 
college-educated labour which offset the wage impact of the increased relative demand for educated 
labour (Baker and Solon, 2003). The triggers of earnings instability are still puzzling. Some argue that the 
weakening  of  the  labour  market  institutions,  increased  labour  market  instability,  increased 
competitiveness, a rise in the temporary workforce which increases earnings exposure to shocks, a period 
of  skill-biased  technological  change,  globalization,  and  immigration  can  increase  earnings  instability 
(Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2002; Katz and Autor, 1999; Rodrik, 1997). 
The  14EU  countries  under  study  belong  to  the  same  economic  area  and  face  similar  economic 
challenges. However, they have different institutional arrangements, thus they respond differently to these 
challenges. In the context of the European economic reality of the early 1990sw, when the single market 
was implemented (1992) and the single currency was being prepared (Maastricht criteria adopted in 1993) 
(Palier, B. 2010), Europe witnessed important labour market policy and institutional changes aimed to 
increase labour market flexibility. These reforms, which have been shifting Europe from labour shedding 
to employment-friendly reforms, are expected to be part of the story behind the re-shaping of the structure 
of earnings inequality across Europe. 
The dominant increase in persistent inequalities, both in levels and shares of the overall inequality, 
observed in Greece, Finland, Italy and Luxembourg may signal an increase in skills differentials. Given 
the high country heterogeneity in their institutional characteristics and the organizational basis of trade 
unions, this outcome may be the result of country-specific factors. For example, in Luxembourg, these 
trends  cannot  be  due  to  the  labour  market  institutions,  as  they  remained  roughly  unchanged.  The 
dominant  increase  in  persistent  differentials  most  likely  is  the  result  of  the  dramatic  labour  market 
structural changes: starting with the late 1970s and intensifying after early 1990s, Luxembourg evolved 
from an industrial economy to one dominated by the tertiary sector which relies heavily on the cross- 
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border  work  force.  This  transition  increased  the  skill  differentials  and  the  returns  to  skills  on  the 
Luxembourgish labour market, enhancing persistent differentials (see also Sologon 2010, Chapter 7). 
In Greece, the weakening of labour in the face of the changing economic circumstances of the 1990s 
– technological change, the opening up of the Greek economy to foreign competition which led to the 
closure of numerous of industrial enterprises, the extensive privatization and the reduced capacity of the 
state to intervene, rising unemployment – coupled with declining union density led to the erosion of union 
strength at the enterprise level (Zambarloukou, S. 2006). These trends are consistent with the dominant 
increase  in  persistent  earnings  differentials.  Moreover,  Tsakloglou  and  Cholezas  (2005)  find  that 
education appears to be a crucial factor shaping the overall distribution of income in Greece. Thus the 
weakening of the labour market institution in the face of the economic changes has the expected effect of 
increasing  returns  to  skills,  thus  persistent  differentials.  The  Italian  and  Greek  cases  share  many 
similarities, which may explain the similar outcome.  
We  find  a  surprising  difference  in  the  evolution  of  two  inequality  components  between  the 
Scandinavian  countries  –  Finland  and  Denmark  –  despite  their  similarities  in  the  labour  market 
institutional  setting.  Finland  records  a  dominant  increase  in  persistent  differentials.  A  potential 
explanation may be the “welfare migration” in the context of the free migration regime characterizing the 
EU-15.  The  generosity  of  the  welfare  state  was  found  to  adversely  affect  the  skill  composition  of 
migration: while low-skilled individual are attracted to a generous welfare state, high-skilled individuals 
are deterred by it as they are net contributors to the tax-benefit schemes (Cohen, A. and Razin, A. 2009). 
Denmark, on the other hand, records a dominant decrease in persistent differentials despite being exposed 
to a similar “welfare migration”. The difference in outcomes may be due to the “Flexicurity” approach, 
which is  more  developed in  Denmark.
xxvi  Thus  Denmark,  may  have  dealt  with the  skill structure  of 
migration in a more efficient way by integrating the immigrants into the labour market through developed 
active labour market policies, boosting their human capital and reducing persistent differentials. 
Besides Denmark, other countries which have gone down the “Flexicurity” route – which represents a 
mix of flexibility (a high degree of job mobility thanks to low employment protection legislation), social 
security (a generous system of unemployment benefits) and active labour market programmes (OECD, 
2004) - are Belgium and Netherlands. These countries recorded a decrease in persistent differentials, both 
in levels and shares of the within-cohort inequality. This mix, however, may have resulted in increased 
earnings  volatility,  especially  for  younger  workers,  which  is  captured  by  the  increase  in  transitory 
inequality.  
In Netherlands, unlike Denmark and Belgium, the increase in transitory inequality dominated. The 
difference between these countries may steam from the difference in the “Flexicurity” approach: the 
Dutch model is based on part-time job flexibility and relatively good social security. The Danish model  
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combines  hiring  and  firing  flexibility  with  relatively  generous  social  security  between  jobs,  a  high 
individual  social  protection,  developed  active  labour  market  policies  (ALMPs)  and  flexible  labour 
markets. Moreover, based on the OECD data, Netherlands developed their ALMPs to a larger extent 
compared with Denmark and Belgium, reaching in 2001 a level twice the Danish one and 4 times the 
Belgian one. Additionally, the unions are much stronger in Belgium and Denmark, which may have 
increased the earnings stability of the reintegrated workers, thus the more moderate increase in earnings 
instability compared with the Netherlands. 
In  Spain  and  Portugal,  the  decrease  in  persistent  inequality  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the 
transitory inequality could be related to problems with the youth labour market characterized by short-
term  contracts  and  high  unemployment.  There  is  also  the  impact  of  migration,  expected  to  increase 
earnings instability.  
In  Germany,  in  the  1990s,  the  dual  effect  of  global  competition  and  the  cost  of  the  unification 
increased  the  pressure  on  the  existing  system  to  change.  While  changes  towards  a  greater  market 
orientation  are  recorded,  the  main  features  of  the  system  have  not  been  altered  (Palier,  B.  2010, 
Zambarloukou, S. 2006). The resistance to change is mirrored also by the quite stagnant structure of the 
earnings  inequality.  The  decrease in  persistent  differentials  accompanied  by  the  increase  in  earnings 
instability may be due in part to early retirement observed during this period, which is still one of the 
most popular instruments in social, labour market, collective bargaining, and human resources policies 
(Tros, 2004). The changing structure of the labour market due to early retirement is reflected in our 
sample: the employment share of the individuals born in the oldest cohort drops by 50% over the sample 
period. Permanent variance increases slightly for the oldest cohort, however, due to its decreasing share in 
the  working  population,  its  contribution  to  the  overall  permanent  variance  drops  dramatically,  thus 
causing the drop in the overall permanent variance. Moreover, older workers (especially white collars) 
enjoy high seniority wages and their early retirement may amplify these trends. Early retirement may 
increase  earnings  instability  by  increasing  the  share  of  young  workers,  which  face  higher  earnings 
volatility. 
In  France, in  the  early  1990s,  in the  face  of  the  new  economic  challenges,  governments  started 
developing active labour market policies and “make work pay” strategies to reduce the unemployment 
trap for socially excluded people (Palier, B. 2010). However, these changes had a reduced impact on the 
inequality structure
xxvii. The same holds for Austria. 
The trends in deregulation and decentralization of industrial relations and cutbacks in social spending 
have  left  no  EU  country  unaffected.  However,  changes  have  gone  the  furthest  in the liberal  market 
economies,  e.g.  the  UK
xxviii  (Zambarloukou,  S.  2006).  In  the  context  of  these  institutional  changes, 
coupled with the economic booming over the period, the labour markets grew substantially particularly in  
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the middle of the distribution over the period, resulting in a slight decrease in persistent inequality and a 
dominant decrease in earnings volatility. Similarly, in Ireland, during the Celtic Tiger, labour markets 
grew substantially particularly in the middle of the distribution over the period. The booming economy 
reduced earnings instability substantially, whereas persistent differentials remained unchanged probably 
due to the highly centralized nature of the wage bargaining.  
Among the 14 EU countries under study, earnings mobility increased only in Denmark, Belgium, 
Spain, Netherlands and Portugal. Different triggering factors are expected to be at work. In Denmark, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the “Flexicurity” route may potentially explain the increase in earnings 
mobility. In Germany, the increase in mobility may be the outcome of early retirement, which increases 
the relative share of the young generations in the labour market which face higher earnings instability. 
Thus, not a real increase in mobility. In Spain and Portugal, the increase mobility may be linked with the 
increased incidence of short-term contracts as measures to tackle the high unemployment of the youth 
labour market.  
7.  Concluding Remarks 
The economic reality of the 1990s in Europe, when the single market was implemented (1992) and 
the single currency was being prepared (Maastricht criteria adopted in 1993), increased the pressure on 
the European labour markets to change. Thus since the early 1990s, Europe has been moving towards 
more flexible labour markets, from labour shedding to employment-friendly reforms, which influenced 
the distribution of earnings across Europe.  
Our study belongs to the strand of literature which explores earnings dynamics in order to understand 
the driving factors behind the evolution of cross-sectional earnings inequality across Europe. Relying on a 
consistent cross-national comparative data set – ECHP -, we explore the extent to which changes in cross-
sectional earnings inequality in 14 EU countries over the period 1994 and 2001 reflect lifetime earnings 
becoming more unequal or the receipt of earnings becoming more unstable. Foremost, our study responds 
to the stringent need of exploring earnings dynamics and the contribution of earnings dynamics to the 
change in the earnings inequality in a comparative setting at the EU level. The common feature that 
emerges across all 14 EU countries is that the main factor behind the change in earnings inequality is the 
change in the “within-cohort” inequality. Thus the main drivers of the within-cohort inequalities are the 
main drivers of the overall inequality.  
The pace of the labour market reforms was different across the EU and led to a continuous departure 
from the traditional welfare regimes (Palier, B. 2010, Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008; OECD, 2004). 
Thus our trial of classifying our findings by any type of welfare regime has proved to be a futile task. 
Country heterogeneity has increased greatly and it is reflected also in the earnings dynamics outcomes.   
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The growth in overall inequality reflects an increase in lifetime earnings inequality accompanied by a 
decrease in the year-to-year mobility, thus both a worsening earnings position of the chronically poor and 
a  decreased  opportunity  for  the  chronically  poor  to  improve  their  earnings  position  in  a  lifetime 
perspective in Greece, Finland, Italy and Luxembourg. In the Netherlands and Portugal, the growth in 
inequality reflects an increase in earnings instability: thus the chronically poor have not gotten poorer and 
the chronically rich have not gotten richer, but there has been an increase in the year-to-year earnings 
mobility. The findings for the Netherlands and Portugal may support the “offsetting mobility” argument: 
lifetime inequality may decrease despite the increase in the cross-sectional inequality provided that there 
has been a sufficiently large increase in mobility. 
The decrease in overall inequality reflects a decrease in lifetime earnings inequality, accompanied by 
an  increase  in  year-to-year-mobility  in  Denmark,  Belgium,  Germany  and  Spain,  signalling  both  a 
bettering earnings position of the chronically poor and an increased opportunity for the chronically poor 
to  improve  their  earnings  position  in  a  lifetime  perspective.  In  France  and  Ireland,  the  stagnation  / 
decrease  in  overall  inequality  reflects  a  decrease  in  earnings  instability  and  a  stagnation  in  lifetime 
inequality, accompanied by a decrease in the year-to year mobility: thus the relative earnings position of 
the chronically poor has not changed, but they recorded a decrease in their opportunity to improve their 
earnings  position  long-term.  In  Austria  and  UK,  both  lifetime  inequality  and  earnings  instability 
decreased,  and  were  accompanied  by  a  decrease  in  the  year-to-year  mobility,  signalling  a  bettering 
earnings position of the chronically poor, but a decrease in their opportunity to improve their earnings 
position in a lifetime perspective. 
Country heterogeneity with respect to the institutional setting signals that mobility trends may have 
different  underlying  factors,  depending  on  the  national  context.  In  Denmark,  Belgium  and  the 
Netherlands,  the  “Flexicurity”  route  may  be  one  of  the  explanations  behind  the  increased  earnings 
mobility. In Germany, the increase in mobility may result from early retirement, which increases the 
relative share of the young generations in the labour market, which face higher earnings instability. In 
Spain and Portugal, the increase in mobility may be linked with the increase in the incidence of short-term 
contracts as measures to tackle the high unemployment of the youth labour market.  
Following these changes, in 2001, earnings persistency is the highest in Portugal, around 6 times the 
lowest persistent dispersion - Denmark. Earnings instability is the highest in Portugal, more than twice the 
lowest earnings instability - Italy, Finland, and Denmark. Earnings mobility (captured by the share of the 
transitory inequality) is the highest in Denmark with a level close to three times the lowest mobility – 
Luxembourg. The outstanding performance of the labour market in Denmark may be due to its approach 
to  “Flexicurity”–  a  mix  of  flexibility  (a  high  degree  of job  mobility  thanks  to  the  low  employment 
protection  legislation),  social  security  (a  generous  system  of  unemployment  benefits)  and  developed  
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active labour market programmes (OECD, 2004). This mix appears to trigger a small lifetime inequality 
and a low earnings instability, assuring at the same time a high opportunity for low wage individuals to 
improve their position in the distribution of lifetime earnings. 
What  has  caused  the  differentials trends  in  long-run  inequality  and  instability  across  the  14  EU 
countries is an important subject for continuing research. Moreover, the situation will certainly change 
with  the  impact  of  the  current  global  economic  crisis  on  the  European  labour  markets.  Thus  future 
research should explore the role of labour market policy and institutional factors and their interactions 
with the macroeconomic shocks in shaping the pattern of permanent and transitory inequality, a topic 
much neglected by the existing literature.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Germany  Mean  9.43  9.49  9.61  9.52  9.57  9.48  9.60  9.72 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.176  0.183  0.174  0.169  0.165  0.182  0.177  0.170 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    66.99  67.37  66.2  63.01  64.84  64.86  64.39 
Denmark  Mean  10.89  11.40  11.58  11.61  11.86  11.85  12.02  12.08 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.091  0.077  0.084  0.080  0.070  0.080  0.079  0.069 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    68.74  66.59  69.43  66.23  67.41  69.6  71.6 
Netherlands  Mean  9.69  9.56  9.59  9.70  10.02  9.88  10.04  9.91 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.119  0.126  0.140  0.125  0.114  0.106  0.114  0.152 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    69.07  71.37  68.68  67.52  67.24  68.56  69.59 
Belgium  Mean  8.48  8.82  8.71  8.75  8.81  8.83  8.92  9.10 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.121  0.097  0.101  0.105  0.096  0.101  0.092  0.103 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    63.43  63.65  64.38  63.88  64.28  65.15  64.38 
Luxembourg  Mean    16.18  15.81  16.73  17.39  17.15  17.22  17.10 
  Var(Ln Earnings)    0.214  0.230  0.225  0.213  0.240  0.249  0.233 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)      64.75  69.48  69.33  69.81  68.71  70.39 
France
xxix  Mean  10.23  9.92  9.87  10.05  10.33  10.60  10.55  10.87 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.233  0.223  0.216  0.230  0.241  0.242  0.236  0.231 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    62.47  64.76  62  52.08  54.24  55.54  60.8 
UK  Mean  8.16  8.11  8.22  8.34  8.68  9.01  9.21  9.68 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.189  0.188  0.177  0.174  0.174  0.167  0.172  0.171 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    64.59  66.31  67.06  67.04  67.36  68.33  68.58 
Ireland  Mean  9.30  9.54  9.76  10.02  10.43  10.84  11.69  12.44 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.249  0.237  0.226  0.213  0.206  0.179  0.167  0.164 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    49.99  50.04  52.41  53.13  54.1  51.63  54.65 
Italy  Mean  7.16  6.91  6.96  7.05  7.29  7.37  7.28  7.32 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.118  0.109  0.117  0.114  0.125  0.122  0.122  0.123 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    51.58  51.19  47.18  47.34  46.87  48.73  48.86 
Greece  Mean  4.95  5.03  5.23  5.59  5.63  5.85  5.70  5.77 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.179  0.184  0.176  0.197  0.199  0.221  0.215  0.205 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    45.83  45.69  44.98  42.09  43.52  46.06  49.72 
Spain  Mean  6.83  6.95  7.09  6.89  7.18  7.37  7.45  7.42 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.243  0.252  0.241  0.252  0.250  0.217  0.208  0.205 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    47.6  48.29  48.49  48.63  52.13  52.12  56.06 
Portugal  Mean  9.08  8.33  8.37  8.49  8.55  8.55  8.54  9.08 
  Var(Ln Earnings)  0.250  0.270  0.258  0.260  0.262  0.241  0.258  0.266 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    57.84  57.5  57.32  56.98  59.12  60.83  62.16 
Austria  Mean    9.08  8.33  8.37  8.49  8.55  8.55  8.54 
  Var(Ln Earnings)    0.137  0.117  0.111  0.096  0.097  0.095  0.101 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)      67.96  68.2  67.49  67.2  66.51  68.21 
Finland  Mean      7.89  8.01  8.41  8.45  8.66  8.86 
  Var(Ln Earnings)      0.100  0.110  0.095  0.107  0.095  0.110 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)        55.95  57.2  59.29  53.83  64.16 
Note: Mean refers to mean positive hourly earnings expressed in Euro. Var(Ln Earnings) refers to the variance of ln hourly earnings. (%t-1 







Table 2. Common EU14 Error-Components Model for Log Real Hourly Earnings: Time and Cohort Shifters[PI+AR(1)] 
  Ge  Dk  Nl  Be  Fr  Lu  UK  Ir  It  Gr  Sp  Pt  At  Fi 
Permanent                             
Exp() = σ
2
   0.146**  0.052**  0.073**  0.07**  0.165**  0.107**  0.104**  0.137**  0.083**  0.109**  0.185**  0.233**  0.095**  0.048** 
λ1, 1995  0.988**  1.014**  1.006**  0.942**  1.051**    1.035**  1.035**  0.989**  1.030**  1.046**  1.013**     
λ1, 1996  0.994**  0.999**  1.033**  1.004**  1.106**  1.022**  0.988**  1.012**  1.029**  1.067**  1.032**  1.088**  0.908**   
λ1, 1997  0.976**  0.919**  1.031**  0.922**  1.134**  1.181**  1.050**  1.095**  1.010**  1.174**  1.060**  1.078**  0.928**  1.171** 
λ1, 1998  0.957**  0.926**  1.126**  0.892**  1.130**  1.249**  1.054**  1.069**  1.125**  1.081**  1.089**  1.087**  0.856**  1.198** 
λ1, 1999  1.012**  0.831**  1.048**  0.785**  1.126**  1.320**  1.050**  1.036**  1.152**  1.156**  1.071**  1.056**  0.773**  1.197** 
λ1, 2000  1.048**  0.802**  1.046**  0.925**  1.058**  1.342**  0.986**  0.996**  1.139**  1.011**  1.018**  1.165**  0.802**  1.183** 
λ1, 2001  0.949**  0.826**  1.112**  0.921**  1.084**  1.298**  1.050**  1.006**  1.147**  1.090**  1.000**  1.152**  0.811**  1.306** 
                             
γ1,51-60  0.986**  0.925**  0.882**  1.013**  0.859**  0.956**  1.017**  0.978**  0.918**  0.886**  0.986**  0.938**  0.903**  0.926** 
γ1,61-70  0.746**  0.775**  0.71**  0.778**  0.78**  0.94**  0.94**  0.86**  0.706**  0.606**  0.782**  0.786**  0.843**  0.841** 
γ1,71-80  0.36**  0.551**  0.501**  0.143**  0.5**  0.593**  0.64**  0.62**  0.542**  0.5**  0.458**  0.332**  0.427**  0.687** 
Transitory                             
Exp()=σ
2
ε  0.146  0.214**  0.068**  0.244**  0.797  0.019**  0.05**  0.043**  0.289**  0.235**  0.138**  0.106**  0.89**  0.031** 
Exp()=σ
2
0,40-50  0.021**  0.033**  0.023**  0.064**  0.064**  0.075**  0.094**  0.091**  0.035**  0.077**  0.044**  0.087**  0.054**  0.062** 
Exp()=σ
2
0,51-60  0.078**  0.021**  0.024**  0.036**  0.036**  0.106**  0.073**  0.059**  0.033**  0.036**  0.071**  0.079**  0.058**  0.054** 
Exp()=σ
2
0,61-70  0.038**  0.029**  0.022**  0.039**  0.039**  0.067**  0.05**  0.061**  0.041**  0.067**  0.072**  0.033**  0.068**  0.054** 
Exp()=σ
2
0,71-80  0.111**  0.026**  0.044**  0.035**  0.035**  0.023**  0.034**  0.072**  0.029**  0.08**  0.05**  0.032**  0.099**  0.056** 
ρ  0.574**  0.539**  0.342**  0.628**  0.399**  0.239**  0.48**  0.341**  0.397**  0.677**  0.263**  0.719**  0.778**  0.275** 
                             
λ2, 1995  0.290**  0.274**  0.685**  0.294**  0.252**    0.921**  0.915**  0.299**  0.503**  0.590**  0.730**     
λ2, 1996  0.221**  0.264**  0.680**  0.240**  0.170**  1.977**  0.923**  0.931**  0.319**  0.385**  0.540**  0.483**  0.240**   
λ2, 1997  0.193**  0.265**  0.664**  0.268**  0.196**  1.440**  0.816**  0.761**  0.285**  0.314**  0.560**  0.542**  0.171**  1.197** 
λ2, 1998  0.214**  0.231**  0.442**  0.278**  0.237**  1.082**  0.801**  0.857**  0.296**  0.388**  0.583**  0.580**  0.140**  0.963** 
λ2, 1999  0.232**  0.310**  0.514**  0.337**  0.228**  1.242**  0.804**  0.848**  0.264**  0.399**  0.515**  0.562**  0.172**  1.213** 
λ2, 2000  0.186**  0.302**  0.604**  0.270**  0.243**  1.364**  0.954**  0.879**  0.277**  0.453**  0.581**  0.551**  0.166**  1.040** 
λ2, 2001  0.248**  0.273**  0.754**  0.326**  0.235**  1.400**  0.890**  0.911**  0.287**  0.423**  0.608**  0.625**  0.166**  1.018** 
                             
γ2,51-60  0.808**  1.17**  1.072**  1.056**  0.938**  0.857**  0.932**  1.055**  1.014**  1.033**  0.965**  0.747**  0.819**  0.875** 
γ2,61-70  0.862**  1.236**  1.132**  1.000**  1.047**  1.045**  1.072**  1.213**  1.076**  1.156**  0.991**  0.995**  0.854**  0.914** 
γ2,71-80  1.199**  1.889**  1.717**  1.357**  1.512**  1.432**  1.236**  1.228**  1.342**  0.981**  1.3**  1.18**  1.071**  1.21** 
SSR  0.0171  0.0069  0.01039  0.0047  0.024  0.0222  0.0072  0.0324  0.0023  0.0186  0.0105  0.0274  0.005  0.0049 
χ
2  3333.33  5825.66  2671.51  17769.4  1756.36  1632.23  2782.61  2125.02  1908.16  4631.35  1946.30  15350.7  2382.06  1044.33 
LogL  446.426  511.817  482.313  540.040  421.969  318.475  508.905  400.507  591.862  440.531  481.594  412.423  402.525  290.562 
Note: The SEs are available upon request from the authors. ** indicates p value of < 0.05 and * indicates a p value of < 0.1.    
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Table 3. Common EU14 Error-Components Models for Log Real Hourly Earnings: Time and 
Cohort Shifters[RG+AR(1)] 
  Ge  Dk  Nl  UK  Ir  Gr  Sp  Fi 
Permanent                 
Exp()=σ
2
   7.261**  0.06**  0.191**  0.047**  0.056**  0.074**  0.464  0.062** 
Exp()=σ
2
φ  0.0024**  0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0001**  0.0000**  0.0001** 
Cov( ,φ)  -0.131**  -0.002**  -0.005**  -0.002**  -0.003**  -0.003**  -0.004  -0.002** 
                 
λ1, 1995  1.073**  0.960**  0.974**  0.992**  0.978**  1.026**  1.051**   
λ1, 1996  1.150**  0.907**  0.975**  0.907**  0.923**  1.008**  1.047**   
λ1, 1997  1.203**  0.795**  0.933**  0.923**  0.960**  1.056**  1.086**  1.127** 
λ1, 1998  1.272**  0.773**  0.988**  0.894**  0.914**  1.039**  1.124**  1.078** 
λ1, 1999  1.408**  0.669**  0.896**  0.857**  0.856**  1.081**  1.116**  1.017** 
λ1, 2000  1.516**  0.627**  0.875**  0.780**  0.793**  0.946**  1.071**  0.955** 
λ1, 2001  1.474**  0.630**  0.910**  0.798**  0.777**  0.944**  1.060**  1.030** 
                 
γ1,51-60  0.44**  1.374**  1.275**  1.413**  1.359**  1.324**  0.888**  1.382** 
γ1,61-70  0.203**  1.962**  1.317**  2.046**  2.013**  1.936**  0.637**  2.44** 
γ1,71-80  0.086**  1.651**  0.789**  2.451**  2.981**  3.853**  0.344**  2.979** 
Transitory                 
Exp()=σ
2
ε  0.258**  0.502  0.126**  0.07**  0.029**  0.171**  0.177**  0.056** 
Exp()=σ
2
0              0.053**   
Exp()=σ
2
0,40-50  0.004**  0.029**  0.023**  0.076**  0.071**  0.078**    0.055** 
Exp()=σ
2
0,51-60  0.056**  0.023**  0.027**  0.079**  0.069**  0.062**    0.059** 
Exp()=σ
2
0,61-70  0.042**  0.032**  0.011**  0.075**  0.094**  0.102**    0.071** 
Exp()=σ
2
0,71-80  0.083**  0.025**  0.041**  0.031**  0.08**  0.07**    0.046** 
ρ  0.358**  0.546**  0.329**  0.451**  0.291**  0.466**  0.264**  0.29** 
                 
λ2, 1995  0.453**  0.182**  0.494**  0.821**  1.227**  0.645**  0.513**   
λ2, 1996  0.380**  0.175**  0.484**  0.814**  1.279**  0.563**  0.468**   
λ2, 1997  0.348**  0.178**  0.484**  0.718**  1.043**  0.492**  0.486**  0.885** 
λ2, 1998  0.351**  0.157**  0.329**  0.703**  1.092**  0.485**  0.508**  0.707** 
λ2, 1999  0.389**  0.210**  0.388**  0.714**  1.060**  0.482**  0.444**  0.930** 
λ2, 2000  0.292**  0.204**  0.454**  0.848**  1.082**  0.574**  0.500**  0.819** 
λ2, 2001  0.396**  0.184**  0.563**  0.798**  1.109**  0.533  0.524**  0.794** 
                 
γ2,51-60  0.955**  1.11**  1.046**  0.895**  0.989**  0.936**  1.007**  0.861** 
γ2,61-70  0.964**  1.155**  1.118**  0.994**  1.099**  1.014**  1.038**  0.871** 
γ2,71-80  1.383**  1.837**  1.728**  1.19**  1.153**  0.941**  1.314**  1.207** 
SSR  0.014  0.007  0.01  0.006  0.027  0.015  0.011  0.004 
χ
2  2473.7  5872.5  2492.8  2597.3  2116.2  3945.7  2032.930  945.1 
LogL  459.3  514.1  486  520.5  412.8  457.2  478.547  300.6 
Note: The SEs are available upon request from the authors. ** indicates p value of < 0.05 and * indicates a p value of < 0.1.    
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Permanent             
Exp()=σ
2
   0.008**  0.033**  0.078**  0.294**  0.256**  0.081 
Exp()=σ
2
φ    0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0002**     
Cov( ,φ)    -0.001**  -0.003**  -0.006**     
Exp()=σ
2
π  0.0001**           
λ1, 1995  0.971**  0.953**  1.020**  1.010**  0.977**   
λ1, 1996  0.924**  0.955**  0.997**  0.973**  1.041**  1.011 
λ1, 1997  0.819**  0.909**  1.039**  0.972**  1.018**  1.057 
λ1, 1998  0.807**  0.987**  1.010**  0.976**  1.019**  0.984 
λ1, 1999  0.705**  0.998**  1.061**  0.959**  0.987**  0.908 
λ1, 2000  0.658**  0.970**  0.924**  0.898**  1.092**  0.940 
λ1, 2001  0.666**  0.948**  0.927**  0.867**  1.076**  0.942 
γ1,51-60  1.269**  1.227**  1.326**  1.162**  0.934**  0.892 
γ1,61-70  1.646**  1.386**  1.937**  0.988**  0.769**  0.835 
γ1,71-80  1.478**  1.561**  3.927**  0.475**  0.314**  0.459 
Transitory             
Exp()=σ
2
ε  0.260**  0.058**  0.118**  0.099**  0.258**  0.483 
Exp()=σ
2
0        0.052**  0.043**  0.075 
Exp()=σ
2
0,40-50  0.031**  0.031**  0.079**       
Exp()=σ
2
0,51-60  0.022**  0.042**  0.057**       
Exp()=σ
2
0,61-70  0.033**  0.052**  0.101**       
Exp()=σ
2
0,71-80  0.027**  0.028**  0.070**       
ρ  0.546**  0.644**  0.600**  0.849**  0.778**  0.701 
θ    -0.251**  -0.149**  -0.364**     
λ2, 1995  0.259**  0.769**  0.799**  0.907**  0.506**   
λ2, 1996  0.248**  0.824**  0.699**  0.815**  0.312**  0.293 
λ2, 1997  0.250**  0.730**  0.617**  0.842**  0.354**  0.209 
λ2, 1998  0.219**  0.754**  0.627**  0.887**  0.372**  0.172 
λ2, 1999  0.292**  0.652**  0.611**  0.760**  0.355**  0.227 
λ2, 2000  0.284**  0.666**  0.720**  0.821**  0.348**  0.220 
λ2, 2001  0.257**  0.700**  0.666**  0.856**  0.392**  0.225 
γ2,51-60  1.131**  0.989**  0.961**  1.004**  0.780**  0.841 
γ2,61-70  1.160**  1.032**  1.019**  1.051**  1.010**  0.899 
γ2,71-80  1.822**  1.330**  0.944**  1.330**  1.107**  1.198 
SSR  0.007  0.002  0.015  0.009  0.029  0.005 
χ
2  5710.016  1576.228  3824.450  1984.959  3737.507  2229.285 
LogL  513.261  611.787  458.005  489.848  408.950  399.618 
Note:  
1. GE, NL, UK, IR, FI: Best Fit is reported in - Table 3: RG+AR1; BE, FR, LU: Best Fit is reported in Table 2: PI+AR1 
2. The SEs are available upon request from the authors.  
3. ** indicates p value of < 0.05 and * indicates a p value of < 0.1.  
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Table 5. Evolution of the overall inequality and its components – within and between-cohort 
inequality between the 1
st and last wave 
Country     Overall Inequality     Within-Cohort Inequality  Between Inequality 
    1st Wave  2001    1st Wave  2001  1st Wave  2001 
AUT  Level  0.137  0.101  Level  0.127  0.092  0.012  0.007 
  Boot. SE  0.002  0.002  % of Overall Inequality      9%  8% 
BEL  Level  0.121  0.103  Level  0.104  0.091  0.017  0.014 
  Boot. SE  0.001  0.001  % of Overall Inequality      14%  14% 
DEU  Level  0.176  0.170  Level  0.155  0.154  0.022  0.017 
  Boot. SE  0.002  0.002  % of Overall Inequality      12%  10% 
DNK  Level  0.091  0.069  Level  0.080  0.064  0.011  0.005 
  Boot. SE  0.001  0.001  % of Overall Inequality      12%  7% 
ESP  Level  0.243  0.205  Level  0.211  0.181  0.033  0.023 
  Boot. SE  0.002  0.002  % of Overall Inequality      13%  11% 
FRA  Level  0.233  0.231  Level  0.208  0.189  0.025  0.040 
  Boot. SE  0.003  0.003  % of Overall Inequality      11%  17% 
GBR  Level  0.189  0.171  Level  0.168  0.155  0.022  0.019 
  Boot. SE  0.002  0.002  % of Overall Inequality      11%  11% 
IRL  Level  0.249  0.164  Level  0.196  0.150  0.055  0.015 
   Boot. SE  0.003  0.004  % of Overall Inequality        22%  9% 
FIN  Level  0.100  0.110  Level  0.092  0.098  0.008  0.008 
  Boot. SE  0.002  0.002  % of Overall Inequality      8%  7% 
GR  Level  0.179  0.205  Level  0.144  0.160  0.034  0.049 
  Boot. SE  0.002  0.002  % of Overall Inequality      19%  23% 
ITA  Level  0.118  0.123  Level  0.103  0.105  0.018  0.018 
  Boot. SE  0.001  0.001  % of Overall Inequality      15%  15% 
LUX  Level  0.214  0.233  Level  0.170  0.189  0.045  0.040 
  Boot. SE  0.003  0.003  % of Overall Inequality      21%  17% 
NLD  Level  0.119  0.152  Level  0.084  0.124  0.035  0.029 
  Boot. SE  0.002  0.002  % of Overall Inequality      29%  19% 
PRT  Level  0.250  0.266  Level  0.220  0.251  0.029  0.017 
   Boot. SE  0.003  0.004  % of Overall Inequality        12%  6% 
Note:  
Bootstrap SE – based on 1000 iterations 







Table 6. Evolution of the aggregate within-cohort inequality and its components – permanent and 
transitory inequality between the 1st and last wave 
Country     Overall Within Inequality   Permanent Inequality  Transitory Inequality 
1st Wave  2001  1st Wave  2001  1st Wave  2001 
AUT  Level  0.127  0.092  Level  0.060  0.046  0.067  0.046 
% of Within Inequality  47%  50%  53%  50% 
BEL  Level  0.104  0.091  Level  0.057  0.041  0.047  0.050 
% of Within Inequality  55%  45%  45%  55% 
DEU  Level  0.155  0.154  Level  0.116  0.103  0.039  0.051 
% of Within Inequality  75%  67%  25%  33% 
DNK  Level  0.080  0.064  Level  0.041  0.025  0.039  0.040 
% of Within Inequality  51%  38%  49%  62% 
ESP  Level  0.211  0.181  Level  0.155  0.102  0.056  0.079 
% of Within Inequality  73%  56%  27%  44% 
FRA  Level  0.208  0.189  Level  0.123  0.123  0.085  0.066 
% of Within Inequality  59%  65%  41%  35% 
GBR  Level  0.168  0.155  Level  0.099  0.097  0.069  0.058 
% of Within Inequality  59%  62%  41%  38% 
IRL  Level  0.196  0.150  Level  0.105  0.105  0.091  0.045 
% of Within Inequality  54%  70%  46%  30% 
FIN  Level  0.092  0.098  Level  0.040  0.062  0.052  0.036 
% of Within Inequality  43%  63%  57%  37% 
GR  Level  0.144  0.160  Level  0.066  0.097  0.078  0.063 
% of Within Inequality  46%  61%  54%  39% 
ITA  Level  0.103  0.105  Level  0.059  0.069  0.044  0.036 
% of Within Inequality  58%  66%  42%  34% 
LUX  Level  0.170  0.189  Level  0.096  0.144  0.074  0.045 
% of Within Inequality  56%  76%  44%  24% 
NLD  Level  0.084  0.124  Level  0.058  0.053  0.027  0.071 
% of Within Inequality  69%  43%  31%  57% 
PRT  Level  0.220  0.251  Level  0.181  0.153  0.040  0.098 
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Annex  
Table A.1. Share of the permanent variance in the overall in equality in the 1
st wave and last wave 
by cohorts 
  Cohort 1940-1950  Cohort 1951-1960  Cohort 1961-1970  Cohort 1971-1980 
  1st Wave  2001  1st Wave  2001  1st Wave  2001  1st Wave  2001 
AUT  51.90  60.33  54.84  63.11  48.26  56.80  13.68  18.26 
BEL  52.18  58.12  64.28  56.09  51.85  45.65  2.17  1.51 
DEU  97.32  78.68  73.29  74.59  64.76  66.76  11.02  28.35 
DNK  63.32  56.50  60.95  49.18  40.65  42.50  16.50  10.51 
ESP  78.60  73.42  78.21  73.11  68.41  58.31  25.73  16.74 
FRA  61.40  78.83  60.27  75.73  65.33  67.37  15.89  28.92 
IRL  68.06  76.74  65.78  78.86  42.18  73.05  32.82  54.15 
UK  60.51  64.31  63.33  72.66  52.92  67.41  52.42  37.01 
FIN  49.23  65.98  47.81  71.61  34.38  70.61  34.26  33.40 
GR  57.67  66.95  58.43  67.92  21.78  56.81  38.36  44.81 
ITA  73.26  77.44  61.20  76.48  38.41  64.81  32.28  35.70 
LUX  58.72  82.37  55.57  85.31  56.32  79.08  44.95  44.51 
NLD  76.24  66.61  65.38  61.03  77.96  42.94  18.38  11.35 
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Notes 
                                                           
i Katz and Autor (1999) define earnings mobility as the rate at which individuals shift positions in the earnings 
distribution. 
ii Inequality in earnings measured over a long period of time, such as lifetime earnings 
iii This structure is equivalent to a random coefficient model where the intercept and the coefficient on age in model 
(4) are randomly distributed across individuals. Therefore, because earnings evolve along an individual specific age 
profile, a good prediction of future earnings requires additional information besides the current earnings. 
iv As argued by Baker (1997), the intuition for this model is not obvious, but the high persistency of the unit root 
model might result from low rates of depreciation of human capital investments or labour market conditions through 
implicit contacts.  
v The European Community Household Panel provided by Eurostat via the Department of Applied Economics at the 
Université Libre de Bruxelles. 
vi The multiplicative constant equals e.g. p*(Population above age 16/Sample Population). The ratio p varies across 
countries so that sensible samples are obtained. It ranges between 0.001-0.01. 
vii Except France, for which gross amounts are observed. 
viii Hourly wage= Current net monthly wage*(4.33*Hours per week).  
ix The demeaned earnings rict adjusts for year, age and cohort effects in a less restrictive way than the preliminary 
regressions typically used, which assume that age and cohort effects within any year can be approximated by a 
polynomial in age.(Baker and Solon, 2003) 
x Age 20 is the lowest age observed in our dataset. 
xi Measurement error is also captured by the transitory component. 
xii 1994 refers to t=0 
xiii See McCurdy(1982, page 92/93) 
xiv Tc and t0c  represent the total number of years and the first year observed for each cohort. 





xvii Spain was estimated with homoskedastic initial conditions. 
xviii The predicted variance resulting from these models follows closely the evolution of the actual variance, 
confirming the fit of the country-models.  
xix The decomposition by cohort identifies how inequality and its components are affected by the labour market 
changes at different lifecycle stages. There is a fundamental conceptual under-identification of time, life-cycle, and 
cohort effects due to the exact multicollinearity of time, age, and birth year. Our decompositions control for cohort 
effects, but the age and period effects are confounded. Since our scope is to decompose within-cohort inequality into 
the two components, the lifecycle effect is considered part of the permanent component, and thus its specific 
identification is disregarded.  
xx These results are similar to those found by Dickens (2000) and Ramos (1999, 2003) for UK, Cervini and Ramos 
(2006) for Spain and Capellari (2003) for Italy. 
xxi The evolution of the overall PV and overall TV depend both on the evolution of the share for each cohort in the 
overall population and on the predicted PV and TV for each cohort.  
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xxii This ranking is consistent with Cholezas and Tsakloglou (2008). 
xxiii Consistent with Cholezas and Tsakloglou (2008). 
xxiv France and Ireland are the only countries where persistent inequality stagnates. 
xxv These trends correspond in general with national analyses. Daly and Valletta’s (2008) findings for Germany 
(1994-1999) and the UK (1994-1997) are consistent with oursxxv, as are results for Ireland (Doris et al.’s, 2008) and 
Italy (Capellari 2003). Overall within-cohort inequality in Spain (1994-2000) is similar to Cervini and Ramos (2006) 
although component trends differ. Regarding the incidence of the persistent inequality, for UK and Germany, Daly 
and Valetta (2008) report values close to our overall estimates. For Spain, Cervini and Ramos (2006) found a higher 
average persistency. For Ireland, Doris et al. (2008) reported an average permanent share of 71%.  
xxvi Based on OECD data, active labour market policies developed extensively in Denmark between 1994 and 2001, 
whereas in Finland they decreased, reaching a level 3 times lower than the one in Denmark in 2001. 
xxvii Another explanation may be the earnings variable used for France, which reports the gross values. 
xxviii In the UK, the low institutionalization of the non-market forces has facilitated the unilateral action of employers 
and government in introducing further decentralization and deregulation of industrial relations and working 
conditions. Moreover, the collective bargaining dropped at the enterprise level, and bargaining coverage has fallen 
sharply. Welfare benefits decreased and the industrial relations are increasingly determined by market mechanisms 
(Zambarloukou, S. 2006). 
xxix Gross Amounts    B.P. 48
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